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Summary: Regulating Robo Advice Across the Financial Services Industry
Summary
In general, a robo advisor can be defined as an automated service that ranks, or matches, consumers to
financial products on a personalized basis, sometimes in addition to providing related services such as
educating consumers and selling products to them. Often associated with web-based financial investment
services, a robo advisor can also include consumer financial product intermediaries such as automated
mortgage brokers and insurance exchanges, as well as lead generation services such as Zillow, NerdWallet, and
Mint.com. Although investment-focused robo advisors have received the most scrutiny from regulators, the
same promises and regulatory concerns raised by investment robo advisors apply to their insurance and
banking counterparts. The benefit of defining robo advisors as a general category of tools that span different
financial services sectors is that an inclusive approach will encourage more cross-sharing and collaborative
thinking to tackle similar challenges and opportunities, including regulatory questions.
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In general, a robo advisor can be defined as an automated service that ranks, or matches, consumers 
to financial products on a personalized basis, sometimes in addition to providing related services such 
as educating consumers and selling products to them.  Often associated with web-based financial 
investment services, a robo advisor can also include consumer financial product intermediaries such as 
automated mortgage brokers and insurance exchanges, as well as lead generation services such as Zillow, 
NerdWallet, and Mint.com. Although investment-focused robo advisors have received the most scrutiny 
from regulators, the same promises and regulatory concerns raised by investment robo advisors apply to 
their insurance and banking counterparts. The benefit of defining robo advisors as a general category of 
tools that span different financial services sectors is that an inclusive approach will encourage more cross-
sharing and collaborative thinking to tackle similar challenges and opportunities, including regulatory 
questions. 
Regardless of the specific financial service, there are four core com-
ponents of robo advisors that require distinct capabilities to assess. 
Each of these components has their own regulatory concern. 
ALGORITHMS AND MODELS
The main regulatory concerns with algorithms and models are 
controlling inherent bias as well as guaranteeing a certain level of 
competency. The programmer who wrote the algorithm may know 
a lot about code, but how much do they know about insurance (or 
other financial products)? 
CORE COMPONENT OF 
ROBO ADVISING
REGULATORY CONCERN
Algorithms and models Bias, competence, fairness
Data
• Financial products and 
attributes
• Consumer attributes
Access, quality
• Producers won’t provide
• Consumer data incomplete, 
biased
Choice architecture Bias, competence
IT infrastructure Security, privacy, reliability
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CONCLUSION 
Robo advising technology is in a nascent stage of development 
and researchers are just beginning to understand the potential 
implications of how automated services will change the financial 
industry. As these automated services proliferate, regulators will 
need to take a more active role in assessing minimum competence, 
protecting consumers, and ensuring robo advising companies 
have access to high quality data. But what is the proper role 
for government in monitoring the quality of robo advice? For 
instance, should there be a minimum competence and honesty 
standard for robo advisors, the equivalent of a broker’s license, or 
registered investment advisor license and insurance agent license? 
Furthermore, what is the role of government in making data 
available to facilitate entrepreneurship in the development of a wide 
range of robo advice tools? While regulators of course need to be 
vigilant, it is also important they not over-react to the deployment 
of robo advisors. 
Any biases the programmer or designer may have, conscious or 
unconscious, could be baked into the code or model. If the algo-
rithm and model pass the bias and competency tests, there is 
an additional concern about fairness. Is the algorithm and model 
somehow classifying the customer from an unfair vantage point 
that is perhaps a reflection of a structural inequality inherent in the 
historical data?
DATA 
Just as there are regulatory concerns about algorithms, there are 
questions about data—not only in ensuring the quality of the data, 
but also taking a proactive role in making data available. One key 
factor that determines what type of robo advisors is developed 
is the ease by which certain types of data can be obtained. For 
example, data surrounding publicly traded securities are easily 
accessible, however, in the cases of mortgages, credit cards, and 
private insurance, this is not so. Without access to reliable data, 
certain parts of the financial sector will be unable to benefit from 
the automated function of robo advice.
The Open Banking or Open API Initiative, which is making progress 
in Europe, is one example of government acting to make data avail-
able to facilitate a private market in tools. The regulatory concerns 
about data are about access: has the company obtained access 
to reasonable sources of data and are there any concerns that an in-
ability to obtain data will lead to bias; where there are gaps in data, 
what are the strategies that the robo advisor considered to address 
the gaps; does the regulator have the authority to increase access 
to data and thereby improve the quality of the robo advice?   
“I have a mantra about data. 
The less you’ve worked with data, 
the better you think data are.” 
CHOICE ARCHITECTURE 
In looking at choice architecture—the organization of the context 
in which people make decisions—the regulatory concern is with 
biases in how information is presented to the consumer and how 
the design of the interface can impact decision making. Regulators 
need to review and confirm that the company has done rigorous 
experimental testing in order to assess whether the robo advisors 
reflect a meaningful and empirically informed choice architecture 
effort. This testing and verification is more difficult in the context 
of hybrid robo advisors, in which customers interact with a person 
who operates the robo advisor behind the scenes. 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INFRASTRUCTURE 
Because robo advisors rely on access to financial, health, banking, 
and other private data, IT security is paramount. Financial services 
regulators already appear to recognize the need to enhance their 
capacities in this area.  
Case Example: Choice Architecture
Behavioral economics research by Eric Johnson, Peter Ubel, 
and David Comerford, studied how preconceived asso-
ciations can alter people’s perceptions of insurance plans. 
Using the North Carolina Health Exchange as a model, the 
researchers asked a sample of participants which category 
of plans they would look at first if they were shopping for 
health insurance. To half the people they described the 
gold plans as having higher monthly premiums and lower 
out-of-pocket costs. For the other half, they switched the 
gold and bronze plans, describing the gold plans as having 
lower monthly premiums and higher out-of-pocket costs. 
Although the labels were arbitrary and shouldn’t impact 
people’s choices, the majority said they preferred gold plans 
over bronze plans, regardless of which plan was labeled as 
gold. 
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